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This paper seeks to test whether analysts are prone to behavioral biases when 
making stock recommendations. In particular, we work with stocks whose performance 
subsequent to a new buy or sell recommendation is in the opposite direction to the 
recommendation. We find that these “nonconforming” recommendations are associated 
with overconfidence bias (as measured by optimism in the language analysts use), 
representativeness bias (as measured by previous stock price performance, market 
capitalization, and book-to-market), and potential conflicts of interest (as measured by 
investment banking relationships). 
 
Our results demonstrate that potential conflicts of interest significantly predict 
analyst nonconforming stock recommendations. This supports recent policy-makers’ 
and investors’ allegations that analysts’ recommendations are driven by the incentives 
they derive from investment banking deals. These allegations have led to 
implementation of rules governing analyst and brokerage house behavior. However, our 
finding that psychological biases also play a major role in the type of recommendation 
issued suggests that these rules may work only in as far as regulating conflicts of 
interest, but will have a limited role in regulating the cognitive biases to which analysts 
appear to be prone. Our results suggest that, as a result of this, analyst stock 
recommendations are likely to  continue to lack investment value. 
 
Keywords: analysts’ recommendations, analysts’ incentives, behavioral finance, 
overconfidence, representativeness bias 
 






Sell-side analysts play an important role in the pricing of stocks in financial 
markets. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that stock prices cannot perfectly reflect all 
information that is available, and therefore analysts devote enormous resources to 
gathering new information. Analysts deserve to be compensated as information 
gatherers. Beaver (2002) indicates that efficient analyst information processing 
facilitates efficient security price setting, while Fernandez (2001) shows that analysts 
produce information that is the “life-blood” of both the market and the individual 
investor. 
Although research attests to the importance of financial analysts for the efficient 
functioning of the capital markets, in the recent past strong doubts have been expressed 
about the credibility and objectivity of their stock recommendations. Specific concerns 
related to the fact that analysts’ recommendations were overly optimistic and did not 
seem to reflect their true beliefs about the stocks they were reporting on. By mid-2000, 
the percentage of buy recommendations had reached 74% of total recommendations 
outstanding while the percentage of sells had fallen to 2% (Barber et al., 2006). The 
main reason held to be responsible for this unequal distribution of buy and sell 
recommendations was that optimistic analyst recommendations could earn their 
investment bank employers large fees from corporate finance transactions. 
The problem of optimistic research reports and the public outcry over analysts’ 
conflicts of interest led to intervention by policy-makers and professional bodies who 
responded by implementing regulations to govern brokerage firms and analysts. In 
September, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD).  Reg FD was meant to curb the practice of 
asymmetric information provision where top executives in companies would disclose 
information to particular analysts, often to those working for the investment banks with 
whom they had ongoing business relationships. In July, 2002, the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the SEC issued NASD 2711 and Rule 472 
respectively. Overall, these two regulations require analyst research reports to display 
the proportion of the issuing firm’s recommendations that are buys, holds and sells. In 
April 2003, the “Global Analyst Research Settlement” was reached between the top ten 
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US brokerage firms and the SEC, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASD and the 
New York Attorney General. This led, inter alia, to these brokerage firms paying $1.4bn 
in penalties for alleged misconduct resulting in investors losing large sums of money 
from trading on their analysts’ stock recommendations during the technology bubble. 
Importantly, however, the intervention of policy-makers and regulators assumes that the 
problem of optimistic analyst reports is caused only by their conflicts of interest. 
Research also finds that although analysts issue optimistic reports on most of the 
stocks they cover, their recommendations lack market impact. For example, Barber et 
al. (2001) and Mikhail et al. (2004) show that, after accounting for risk and transaction 
costs, investors do not earn better than average returns from following analysts’ stock 
recommendations. Womack (1996), on the other hand, finds that new buy stock 
recommendations continue to go up for four to six weeks after the new stock 
recommendation is made, while new sell recommendations lead to stock prices drifting 
significantly lower for six more months. His results suggest that the average level of 
recommendation has little investment value but changes in level are valuable, although 
for a limited time. These research findings lead to the question of what causes analysts 
to issue stock recommendations that lack investment value. 
This paper argues that an important determinant of the apparent judgmental 
errors made by analysts is cognitive bias. Although there are various cognitive biases 
documented in the behavioral finance literature, two salient biases recognized as key in 
explaining the “irrational” behavior of market participants are overconfidence and 
representativeness. 
Overconfidence is defined as overestimating what one can do compared to what 
objective circumstances would warrant. The more difficult the decision task, and the 
more complex it is, the more successful we expect ourselves to be. Overconfidence may 
help to explain why investment analysts believe they have superior investment insights, 
and yet their stock recommendations are of limited investment value. Various authors 
suggest the overconfidence of investors, including analysts, plays a major role in the 
anomalies observed in financial markets. For example, Odean (1998a) looks at the 
buying and selling activities of individual investors at a discount brokerage. On average 
the stocks that individuals buy subsequently underperform those they sell even when 
liquidity demands, risk management, and tax consequences are taken into consideration. 
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He suggests that this behavior of selling winners too soon is motivated by 
overconfidence. Barber and Odean (2001) assert that rational investors trade only if the 
expected gains exceed transaction costs. But overconfident investors overestimate the 
precision of their information and thereby the expected gain of trading. 
The representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) involves 
making judgments based on stereotypes rather than on the underlying characteristics of 
the decision task. People tend to categorize events as typical or  representative of a well-
known class and then, in making probability estimates that overstress the importance of 
such a categorization, disregard evidence about the underlying probabilities. One 
consequence of this heuristic is for people to see patterns in data that is truly random 
and draw conclusions based on very little information. Shefrin and Statman (1995) 
indicate that investors believe that good stocks are stocks of good companies, which is 
not necessarily true. This is rooted in the representative bias, which supports the idea 
that winners will always be winners and losers will always be losers. DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) argue that because investors rely on the representative heuristic they 
could become overly optimistic about past winners and overly pessimistic about past 
losers. This bias could cause prices to deviate from their fundamental level.  
The aim of this paper is to establish whether policy-makers are addressing the 
only important issue in seeking to address conflicts of interest alone, or whether other 
factors, in particular, analyst cognitive bias, which may be difficult to regulate, also play 
a major role in influencing analysts to issue stock recommendations that lack market 
impact. 
Using an appropriate benchmark metric, we first evaluate the performance of 
analyst stock recommendations over the 12-month period after their recommendations 
are changed from their previous categories to new buy (sell) categories. In line with the 
results of earlier studies (e.g. Womack, 1996), we find that the stockmarket reacts 
significantly to new buy recommendations only in the recommendation month (month 
0), with no subsequent drift. Conversely, the market reacts significantly and negatively 
to new sell ratings, not just in the month of recommendation change. It also exhibits a 
significant post-recommendation stock price drift of -8% in the subsequent 12 months 
over and above the 5.6% fall in the recommendation month.  
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With both buy and sell recommendations, many stocks perform different to 
expectations. For instance, there are new buys (sells) that underperform (outperform) 
the benchmark 12 months after the recommendation is made. To focus on these stocks 
where analysts can be viewed, ex post, as having made erroneous judgment calls, we 
therefore work with cases where subsequent stock performance is contrary to 
expectations. We find in our data that 56% of new buy recommendations underperform 
the appropriate benchmark 12 months after the recommendations are changed and, of 
these, more that 6 out of 10 stocks (62%) underperform the benchmark by at least 20% 
by month 12. On the other hand, 70% of new sell recommendations perform as 
expected over the 12-month period and only 16% outperform the benchmark by at least 
20% by month 12. 
We then establish which factors are associated with these “contrarian” stocks.  
We find that analysts’ stock recommendations that perform contrary to expectations are 
associated with (i) overconfidence bias (as measured by the optimistic tone of language 
used in their research reports), (ii) representativeness bias (as measured by previous 
positive stock price performance, size of firm, and growth status of the firm (book-to-
market)), and (iii) corporate relationships between their investment bank employers and 
the firms they are following. These findings imply that the regulations recently 
promulgated to govern analyst and brokerage house activity, however successful they 
might be in dealing with analyst conflict of interest, may have only limited impact on 
problems associated with analyst cognitive bias, which is probably inherent in the 
nature of their work.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section formulates 
our research hypotheses. In section 3 we present our data and in section 4 we describe 
our research method. Section 5 discusses the price performance of new stock 
recommendations both for our full sample and also for our nonconforming stocks. 









Our null hypotheses about the determinants of nonconforming analysts’ stock 
recommendations are grouped under two broad categories, cognitive biases and 
corporate relationships. 
2.1. Cognitive biases 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) postulate that when people are faced with 
complicated judgments or decisions, they simplify the task by relying on heuristics or 
general rules of thumb. Because of the complex nature of the analyst’s work, we 
postulate they are likely to be prone to cognitive biases, in particular, overconfidence 
and representativeness. 
2.1.1.  Overconfidence bias 
We measure overconfidence bias by the tone of language that analysts use in 
their research reports. To do this we employ Diction (Hart, 2000), a computerized 
content analysis package.1 Diction detects semantic tonalities in a document and 
employs a series of lexicons for the occurrence of words that represent various pre-
specified semantic tones in sample comparison databases.2 (Further discussion on the 
Diction package is given in section 4.3 below). To measure overconfidence we use the 
variables OPTIMISM and CERTAINTY, provided by Diction. OPTIMISM is defined 
in Diction as language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting 
their positive entailment, while CERTAINTY is defined as language indicating 
resoluteness, inflexibility, completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra. Our first 
null hypothesis is thus defined as follows: 
H10:  The tone of the language used by investment analysts in their research 
reports to justify their stock ratings is not optimistic independent of 
whether the stock recommendation is new buy or new sell. 
 
                                           
1 Broadly speaking content analysis methodology documents the frequency with which ideas/ concepts 
appear in a text. An underlying assumption of content analysis is that frequency of occurrence is a proxy 
for the importance of that factor in driving the course of an argument in a document. 
2 These dictionaries were constructed by expert linguists from the analysis of more than 20000 texts. Its 
automated nature both for coding and quantification makes it attractive as a research instrument (Sydserff 
and Weetman, 2002).   
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If overconfidence bias (as measured by OPTIMISM and CERTAINTY) 
influences analyst stock recommendations, then we expect it to have a significant 
positive (negative) impact on their new buy (sell) ratings that subsequently perform in a 
contrarian manner.  
 
 
2.1.2.  Representativeness bias 
 
2.1.2.1.  Activity 
We use the Diction variable ACTIVITY to measure the degree of 
representativeness bias in the language used by analysts when preparing their research 
reports.  ACTIVITY is defined in Diction as language featuring movement, change, and 
the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia. Fogarty and Rogers (2005) 
conclude that analysts’ decisions about firms’ stock tend to be influenced by their 
knowledge of corporate plans, merger/acquisition talk, or any suggestion of proffered 
change in corporate direction. Our second null hypothesis is therefore stated as follows: 
H20: The tone of the language used by investment analysts in their research 
reports to justify their stock ratings is not positively biased towards the 
level of activity (or change) taking place within the firm. 
 
2.1.2.2.  Previous price performance 
Stickel (2000) posits that Wall Street “darlings” are stocks with, among other 
characteristics, recent positive EPS momentum and surprise, and recent positive relative 
price momentum. Analysts have incentives to give buy recommendations to stocks with 
these financial characteristics because they follow from documented momentum pricing 
anomalies, and because they are actionable ideas that generate trading commissions. We 
take previous price momentum as another measure of representativeness bias in that 
analysts might assume that the previous price performance of the stock is representative 
of the future performance of the stock. Null hypothesis 3 is therefore established as 
follows: 
H30: Price momentum either has a negative (positive) or insignificant impact 
on whether analysts will issue a buy (sell) recommendation which does 
not perform as expected. 
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Variable PRICE_MOM is used to capture the effect of price momentum on 
analysts’ new buy/sell recommendations. We define PRICE_MOM as the percentage 
price change in a stock in the year prior to the recommendation change expressed on an 
average monthly basis. If a stock’s past performance has a direct influence on the type 
of stock recommendation that an analyst issues, positive PRICE_MOM will be 
associated with buy recommendations and negative PRICE_MOM with sell 
recommendations. That is, firms that receive buy recommendations are those that have 
consistently performed well in the recent past, while sell recommendations are given to 
stocks that have performed poorly over the previous period. 
 
2.1.2.3.  Size of firm 
We consider firm size as another potential aspect of representativeness bias in 
that analysts might assume that a large (small) firm is a good i.e., well-managed (bad) 
firm, and thus will subsequently outperform (underperform) the benchmark (Solt and 
Statman, 1989). Null hypothesis 4 is therefore established as follows: 
 
H40: Firm market capitalization does not have any significant impact on the 
type of stock recommendation issued by analysts for stocks which 
subsequently perform contrary to expectation. 
 
Variable FIRM_SIZE is used to pick up the effect of market capitalization on 
the determination of buy and sell recommendations. As in Mikhail et al. (2004), size of 
the firm is measured using the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for the 
firm at the end of the financial year preceding the recommendation revision. Our 
conjecture is that large firms are less likely to receive sell recommendations than small 
firms; on this basis, new nonconforming buy recommendations are likely to be 
associated with larger values of FIRM_SIZE, and new non-confirming sell 
recommendations with smaller values on this variable. 
 
2.1.2.4.  Book-to-market 
Most buy recommendations are made by analysts who tend to favor “growth” 
over “value” stocks. This is because growth stocks exhibit greater past sales growth and 
are expected to grow their earnings faster in the future. Financial characteristics of 
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preferred stocks include higher valuation multiples, more positive accounting accruals, 
investing a greater proportion of total assets in capital expenditure, recent positive 
relative price momentum, and recent positive EPS forecast revisions (Jegadeesh et al., 
2004). Based on these arguments, we expect that stocks with low book-to-market ratios 
(growth stocks) are more likely to receive buy recommendations than stocks with high 
book-to-market ratios (value stocks). Book-to-market can be used to measure 
representativeness bias on the basis that current growth characteristics could be taken as 
representative of the stock’s likely future performance by analysts. Null hypothesis 5 is 
therefore established as follows: 
 
H50: The firm’s book-to-market ratio does not have any significant impact 
on the type of recommendation issued by analysts for stocks which 
subsequently perform contrary to expectation.  
 
Variable BTOM is used to capture the effect of book-to-market on our 
nonconforming stock recommendations. It is measured as book value per share divided 
by market price of equity. Book value per share is calculated as total assets minus total 
liabilities deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the firm’s previous 
fiscal year. Market value of equity is calculated by dividing the firm’s market value by 
the total number of shares in issue (Mikhail et al., 2004). All accounting measures are 
obtained from COMPUSTAT. High values of BTOM are expected to be associated with 
buy recommendations and low values with sell recommendations. 
 
 
2.2.  Conflicts of interest: corporate relationships between investment banks and firms  
 
 Analyst compensation methods associated with potential or actual corporate 
finance relationships between their investment bank employers and the firms they report 
on have been a serious cause for concern in the recent past.  Null hypothesis 6 is 





H60: There is no relationship between the analyst’s new stock 
recommendation for a subsequently nonconforming stock and whether there 
is an existing relationship between the investment bank and the particular 
firm.   
 
Variable INVEST_RELATE is constructed to measure the relationship between 
the firm being researched and the investment bank which employs the analyst. This 
variable takes the value of 0 if no relationship exists between the firm and the brokerage 
house, 1 if the brokerage house is an underwriter3 of the firm or has current holdings4 in 
the firm, and 2 if the brokerage firm is both an underwriter and has a current holding. 
Information about such relationships between firms and brokerage houses is found in 
the disclosure section of analysts’ research reports. Higher values of INVEST_RELATE 
are expected to be associated with new buys, and lower values with new sells. That is, 
firms which have some form of relationship with the analyst’s investment bank are 
more likely to receive buy recommendations, while firms with no such relationship are 
more likely to receive sell recommendations, ceteris paribus. 
 
2.3. Control variables 
2.3.1 Analyst following 
 
We introduce analyst following as a control variable to ensure that the test of the 
relation between recommendation type for nonconforming stocks and our cognitive bias 
and conflict of interest variables are not confounded by the number of analysts 
following the firm. 
Analyst following is perceived to be essential for the correct valuation of the 
firm by the market. Bhushan (1989) and Hussain (2000) observe that the number of 
analysts following a stock is positively related to the number of institutions holding the 
firm’s shares, the percentage of the firm held by institutions, firm return variability, and 
firm size. For example, large firms are found to have a larger analyst following than 
small firms. O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) and Hussain (2000) note that analyst 
following is higher for industries with regulated disclosures and with a higher number 
                                           
3 Underwriter means that the investment bank acts as an underwriter by providing advice to the issuing 
firm, by distributing securities, by sharing the risk of issue and by stabilising the aftermarket. 
4 Current holding means one of the management team owns shares in the company being researched or 
does some work for the company.  
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of firms. Lang and Lundhom (1996) document a positive association between analyst 
following and analyst forecast accuracy.  
Our variable ANALY_FOLL is represented by the total number of analysts 
following the firm taken from the Thomson Financial, Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (IBES).  It is postulated that there might be some indirect relationship between 
the number of analysts following the firm and the recommendation issued. We know 
that the larger the firm (in terms of market capitalization) the greater is the analyst 
following. As we have seen above, size of firm could have an influence on the type of 
stock recommendation issued. Therefore, we might expect higher values of 
ANALY_FOLL to be associated with new buy recommendations and lower values with 
new sell recommendations. 
 
2.3.2.  Target price 
 Target price is introduced as a second control variable. Brav and Lehavy (2003) 
document a significant market reaction to changes in target prices, both unconditionally 
and conditional on contemporaneously issued stock recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions. Their results suggest that price targets have information content 
beyond that which is contained in the stock recommendation. As such, stock 
recommendations should not be looked at in isolation by investors but be used together 
with target prices. Analysts associate target price direction as being indicative of what 
the stock recommendation direction should be, which means that target price is 
considered to be representative of the type of stock recommendation analysts will issue.  
 
Target price change variable TGTPRCE_CHNG is constructed to measure the 
effect of target prices on the determination of buy and sell recommendations. This 
control variable is represented by the 12-month percentage change in the analyst’s 
projected target price for a firm; it is computed as the new target price divided by the 
old target price minus 1.  Current and previous target prices are obtained from the 
respective analyst research reports. In cases where the previous target prices are not 
available in the current reports, such data is obtained from the Thomson Financial First 
Call database. It is anticipated that the coefficient on TGTPRCE_CHNG will be 
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The source of analysts’ stock recommendations used in this research is the IBES 
detailed recommendation file. Our sample covers stock recommendations for the period 
from January 1, 1997 through to December 31, 2003 issued by the top-ten US brokerage 
firms as identified in the December 2001 issue of the Institutional Investor survey of 
institutional investors (Womack, 1996). 
Different brokerage firms use different stock rating systems which IBES recodes 
into five categories “strong buy”, “buy”, “hold”, “underperform” and “sell”. In line with 
earlier research (e.g. Womack, 1996), these are further reclassified in this research into 
three categories “buy”, “hold”, and “sell” to allow for easy and intuitive interpretations 
of our empirical results. This reclassification is also consistent with rule NASD 2711 
which requires brokers to partition their recommendations into just these three 
categories for disclosure purposes, regardless of the actual rating system they use. 
Only changes in recommendations and not reiterations are employed in this 
study because changes in recommendations have higher information content than 
reiterations (e.g., Womack, 1996; Francis and Soffer, 1997). Changes examined are new 
buy recommendations following previous sells or holds, and new sell recommendations 
from previous buys and holds.  
Table 1 shows how we arrive at our final sample. The January 2004 IBES 
database contains a total of 363,000 stock recommendations. Eliminating those 
recommendations made outside our sample period of January 1, 1997 to December 31, 
2003, recommendations not issued by top-ten brokerage firms, reiterations and utilities 
and financial firms leaves a total of 16,198 recommendation changes. Each such stock 
must have its market price information available in the Centre for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database when the change in recommendation is made, lack of such data 
leads to the elimination of around a further 2,000 cases. The final sample consists of 






Figure 1 presents the distribution of new buys, holds and sells over our sample 
period. Consistent with Barber et al. (2006), it shows the dramatic change in the 
distribution of stock recommendations over the 7 years; this is particularly conspicuous 
in 2002 when there are 23% buys, 51% holds and 26% sells. During 2000 the ratio of 
new buys to sells reaches its highest level of 49:1 but plunges to 0.9:1 in 2002. While 
this decline may be attributed to other factors such as economic conditions and the 
collapse in market prices, it is most likely due to the implementation of NASD 2711 and 






Table 2 provides the matrix of recommendation changes for the whole sample 
period. Thirty-five per cent of the changed recommendations are new buys, 52% are 
new holds, while 13% are new sells. A very large proportion of new buy (sell) 
recommendations are previously from the hold category. Analysts are more likely to 
downgrade stocks than upgrade them (59% versus 41%). About 77% of downgrades are 
from buy to hold, 19% are from hold to sell, while only 4% are from buy to sell. On the 
other hand, 82% of upgrades are from hold to buy, 15% are from sell to hold, while 3% 
are from sell to buy. This pattern indicates that movement in stock recommendations is 
very rarely from one extreme category to another, i.e., directly from buy to sell and vice 






                                           
5 Refer to Barber et al. (2003) for more information about these rules. 
Table 1 here 
Figure 1 here 




This section describes how we measure the market impact of new stock 
recommendations and target prices, how we select our nonconforming stocks, and how 
we conduct our content analysis of analyst research reports. The final sub-section 
describes our logistic regression approach to determining the extent to which analyst 
cognitive bias and conflicts of interest might be driving their recommendations for 
stocks which subsequently perform contrary to expectations. 
 
 
4.1 Method used to evaluate stock recommendations  
The event study method is used to examine the reaction of investors to changes 
in financial analysts’ stock recommendations. This approach is based on the assumption 
that capital markets are sufficiently efficient to evaluate the impact of new information 
(events) on firm value. The relevant event date in this study is defined as that date when 
the stock recommendation is changed from its previous rating to new buy or sell ratings. 
 
4.1.1.  Return generating methodology 
The reference portfolio method with the event firm matched on the basis of 
industry, size and book-to-market is used as our benchmark approach. Intuitively, 
matching primarily by industry is appropriate compared with an economy-wide 
benchmark, because analysts often study firms within their industry context and 
specialize in particular industries. Many analysts even provide a full industry analysis 
before they conduct specific stock analysis in their research reports. And, to a great 
extent, the final decisions they make on the individual stocks they follow are influenced 
by what is happening to the respective industry at large. For example, Boni and 
Womack (2006) find that analysts take strong cues from recent industry returns in 
revising the ratings of the stocks they follow. In fact, most of the brokerage firms in this 
study define their stock recommendation categories in terms of expected future stock 
performance relative to respective industry average performance.  
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Concurrent controls for size and book-to-market are expected to capture the 
cross-sectional variation in average monthly returns. These measures are good proxies 
for common risk factors (Fama and French, 1992; 1993) inherent in different industries. 
Although previous studies (e.g., Carhart, 1997) have established that momentum is also 
an important factor in explaining stocks’ abnormal returns, it is not controlled for in our 
expected return generating model as the resulting reference portfolios would contain too 
few cases. 
 
4.1.2.  Constructing benchmark portfolio returns 
To form industry reference portfolios, stock industry codes are obtained from 
the CRSP database. These codes are then used to classify all stocks from NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ with data in the CRSP stock-return file into industry deciles in the 
manner of Fama and French in their 12-industry portfolios classification process,6 
although, in our case, only 10 industry portfolios are used because the finance and 
utility industries are excluded. Within each industry decile, firms are ranked into thirds 
based on size, and then broken down further into three groups based on their book-to-
market ratio. Thus, a total of 90 reference portfolios grouped by industry, size, and 
book-to-market are formed. For example, the stocks in portfolio 1 are stocks in industry 
1, are in the largest size group, and within the highest third of book-to-market ratios.7  
Portfolios are formed in June of each year, starting in June 1997, and monthly returns 
are calculated for the portfolios for the following 12 months after the portfolio 
formation date. For each benchmark portfolio, its equally-weighted portfolio return is 
calculated as the arithmetic return of all securities in the particular industry, size and 
book-to-market intersection set in the year of portfolio formation.  
Size is measured by market capitalization calculated as month-end closing price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Size data is obtained from CRSP. Book 
value is defined as COMPUSTAT book value of stockholders’ equity (COMPUSTAT 
item 60). A six-month lag is used in the case of book value to allow for delay in the 
publication of annual financial statements (Barber and Lyon, 1997). Thus, for 
                                           
6 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
7 For robustness, we also reverse the criteria and sort by industry, book-to-market, and size in that order. 
All our results remain the same. 
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calculating the book-to-market ratio for year t, the book-value used would be from the 
financial statements for year t-1. 
 For each sample firm i, the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHARiT), where T is the 
holding period in months, is calculated as the difference between the firms buy-and-
hold return (Rit), and the buy-and-hold return on the respective reference portfolio p 
(Rpt) over the period commencing at the begining of the month following the 
recommendation, and ending T months later.  Firm BHARs are calculated as follows: 
    








itiT ))E(R(1)R(1BHAR             (1)
  
Some stocks are delisted between the date of change in stock recommendation or 
target price, and before the end of the 12-month period. For all stocks that have missing 
returns after the dates of their new stock recommendations, the returns on the 
corresponding reference portfolios are deemed to be their realized returns (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997).8 
         
 
4.2 Method for selecting nonconforming stocks 
In the preceding section, we discuss how we measure stock performance over a 
12-month period. This section describes how we select stocks that have not performed 
as expected by the analyst, i.e., new buy (sell) recommendations that underperform 
(outperform) the reference portfolio benchmark over the 12-month period following the 
changed stock recommendations. 
In theory, a ‘buy’ recommendation is issued when a stock is perceived to be 
undervalued. Conversely, a ‘sell’ recommendation is issued when a stock is believed to 
be overvalued, while a stock awarded ‘hold’ is believed to be fairly priced. The 
definitions of stock recommendations by the top ten brokerage firms follow this same 
                                           
8 In order to avoid possible issues of cross-sectional dependence arising from possible multiple 
recommendations issued in respect of the same stock we adopt the approach used in Stickel (1995) 
whereby all recommendations and target prices of the same type that are changed within a period of 6 
months of the first change (either made by the same broker or a different broker) are dropped from our 
analysis. 
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idea but go even further in specifying the actual percentages by which the stocks that 
are classified to each of the three categories are expected to outperform/underperform 
the respective industry averages. Generally, according to brokerage firms, a buy (sell) 
recommendation is expected to outperform (underperform) the industry benchmark by 
10% or more, depending on risk.   
The selection of nonconforming stock recommendations is thus based on how 
the stock ratings are defined by our sample brokerage firms. Therefore, in this research, 
a buy recommendation is deemed to be performing contrary to analysts’ expectations if 
the associated subsequent stock performance over the following 12-month period is at 
least 10% lower than that of the respective benchmark. Conversely, a sell 
recommendation is not conforming to analysts’ expectations if subsequent performance 
exceeds that of the benchmark by at least 10% over the next 12 months.  
However, in our formal analysis, we increase the cut-off percentage to at least 
20% so that only extreme cases of non-conformance are analyzed, i.e., only buys (sells) 
that underperform (outperform) the reference benchmark by at least -20% (+20%) are 
considered. This approach provides a much cleaner test because if the analyst 
recommendation is associated with stock returns in line with the analyst’s output, then it 
is difficult to distinguish between bias and valid judgment. Investigating extreme cases 
of stocks with nonconforming subsequent stock returns is an attempt to remove 
analysts’ correct judgmental processes. Although analysts may be biased, even if the 
stock’s performance is in line with what is expected, we believe potential bias may be 
much more directly observable when the outturn is demonstrably wrong to a significant 
extent, i.e., at least 20% below or above what is expected. Therefore, focusing on 
extreme nonconforming situations is viewed as being a cleaner way of testing our 
research hypotheses than using, for example, a random sample of all new buy and new 
sell cases. 
 
4.3 Content analysis method  
 
Data for H10 and H20 is collected using the automated computerized content 
analysis package Diction (Hart, 2000). This measures a text for its verbal tone across 
five variables namely: optimism, certainty, activity, realism and commonality. The use 
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of Diction is well-established in the applied linguistics literature  (e.g., Hart, 2000; 
2001). Its validity and reliability as a computerized content analysis program has been 
widely attested to (e.g., Morris 1994; Sydserff and Weetman, 2002). Diction has been 
mostly used in accounting applications but less so in finance. Most similar to this 
research, Fogarty and Rogers (2005) use Diction in conjunction with other content 
analysis software to study financial analyst reports and argue that we can understand 
analysts and their work better if we do not just analyze the numerical values in their 
reports, but also the textual data. They conclude that analyst reports are characterized by 
bias, skew and lack of science. This study builds on Fogarty and Rogers (2005) by also 
applying Diction to analyst reports, but with the specific intention of measuring 
analysts’ potential behavioral biases. 
 
4.4 Factors which differentiate between nonconforming new buy and new sell 
recommendations 
 
We fit a logistic regression model using maximum likelihood estimation to 
determine the factors that differentiate between the nonconforming new buy and new 
sell recommendations. In this model, the dependent variable is RATING, and the 
independent variables, defined in section 2 above, are OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY, 
ACTIVITY, PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM, INVEST_RELATE, while 
ANALY_FOLL and  TGTPRCE_CHNG are control variables. Binary variable 
RATING denotes the nonconforming buy or sell stock recommendation. RATING = 1 
if an analyst issues a new buy recommendation which underperforms its respective 
reference portfolio benchmark by at least -20%, and 0 if a new sell is issued that 
outperforms the respective reference portfolio benchmark by at least +20%.  
Diction variables OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY and ACTIVITY, which serve as 
proxies for overconfidence and representativeness psychological biases, are derived 
from the actual research reports written by analysts to justify their stock 
recommendations. TGTPRCE_CHNG, the variable which measures the percentage 
change in analyst projected target price, and INVEST_RELATE, the variable measuring 
the relationship between brokerage houses and firms, are also obtained from the same 
research reports that provide scores for OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY and ACTIVITY. If 
TGTPRCE_CHNG information is missing from the research reports, such information 
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is obtained from the First Call database. PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE and BTOM values 
are calculated from data obtained from the CRSP database and COMPUSTAT, while 
ANALY_FOLL is taken from IBES. 
Our logistic model is specified in equation 2 as follows: 










                                          = α  + β 1OPTIMISMj,t +β 2 CERTAINTYj,t + β 3 ACTIVITYj,t       
                                                         +β 4PRICE_MOMj,t-1+β 5FIRM_SIZEj,t-1+β 6BTOMj,t-1 
                                                         +β 7INVEST_RELATEj,t+β 8ANALY_FOLLj,t          
                                                                                        + β 9TGTPRCE_CHNGj,t-1+εj,t                                                        (2) 
 
where RATING = 1 for nonconforming new buy stocks and 0 for 
nonconforming new sell stocks, β1….β9 are the logistic regression parameter 
estimates, and εj, t is the error term.  
 
 
5. Market reaction to changes in stock recommendation 
 
This section first reports the medium-term market reaction to all stock 
recommendations that are changed to buy and sell categories. It then provides parallel 
results for the stocks that do not perform as expected 12 months after the change in 
recommendations.  
 
5.1 Performance of new buy and new sell recommendations 
Table 3 summarizes the abnormal return performance attributable to new buy 
and new sell recommendations. Panel A shows that the BHARs for our 2,230 new buy 
recommendations are driven mainly by the returns in the month of recommendation 
change (t=0), and there is no post-recommendation drift. Thus, mean abnormal return in 
the month of new recommendation is +5.7% (t = 13.6) and does not change 
significantly in the subsequent months. By month 12, the mean BHAR is 7.9%, while 
the median is -5.0%. A total of 123 firms (5.5%) are delisted over the 12-month 
performance evaluation period. The fact that we find that the market reaction to new 
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buys is only significant in month 0 corroborates the findings of Stickel (1995), Womack 
(1996) and Barber et al. (2001) that the value of new buy recommendations is short-






Table 3, panel B, however, provides clear evidence of continuing negative 
market reaction for up to 12 months following new sell stock recommendations. Mean 
abnormal return in the recommendation month for our 1,070 cases is -5.6% (t = 6.8), 
and increases to -13.6% (t = -4.7) by month 12.  Median BHAR is significantly negative 
over the 12-month period, rising from -4.3% in month 0 to -19.9% by month 12. A total 
of 79 firms (7.4%) are delisted over the period of performance evaluation. Figure 2 
graphs the intertemporal BHAR patterns for both new buys and sells, visually 





The performance of new sell recommendations observed here is again consistent 
with the findings of Stickel (1995), Womack (1996) and Barber et al. (2001) in that 
reaction to negative stock recommendations is incomplete in the recommendation 
month, with the market continuing to underreact for many months subsequently. 
Although earlier studies observe underreaction over a 6-month period, here we find 
such underreaction continues for at least 12 months. This post-recommendation drift in 
BHARs for new sell recommendations lends support to the idea that investors find 
difficulty in adjusting their expectations about future stock performance, at least in the 
bad news case. Such slow assimilation of news by investors, behavioral research 
proposes, can explain the market underreaction phenomenon more generally (e.g., 
Barberis et al., 1998). 
 
 
Table 3 here 
Figure 2 here 
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5.2. Performance of nonconforming stocks 
Table 4, panel A shows that 3 in 5 (62%) of all new buy recommendations earn 
positive returns in the month that the recommendation is changed. However, by month 
12 after the stocks are first awarded a buy recommendation, less than half (45%) still 
have positive BHARs with the majority (55%) experiencing negative returns. The 
interesting question is what percentage of these stocks actually attains at least the 
minimum 10% outperformance of the benchmark stipulated by the brokerage firms in 
their definition of buy recommendations. 
 
Panel A also shows that, on average, only just over a third (35%) of stocks that 
receive new buy status outperform the benchmark by at least 10% over the 12-month 
period, the minimum outperformance required by our brokerage firms to represent a buy 
recommendation; whilst two-thirds (65%) do not.  In fact, of the new buy cases that 
underperform the benchmark, no less than 6 out of 10 stocks (62%) underperform the 
benchmark by -20% or more by month 12.9 These are the stocks that are of most interest 
in this research, which has as its main purpose to establish why such stocks are awarded 
a new buy recommendation and yet perform so poorly and contrary to expectation. 
In the case of new sell recommendations, table 4, panel B indicates that in the 
month of the recommendation change 3 in 5 of the stocks in our sample receiving sell 
ratings (63%) earn negative abnormal returns, while over a third (37%) earn positive 
returns. However, in contrast to Panel A, by month 12 following the recommendation 
change, no less than 70% of these stocks are earning negative returns. Six out of 10 
(59%) of these stocks with a sell rating underperform the benchmark by at least 10%, 
which is the minimum percentage underperformance required by the brokerage firms to 
define a sell recommendation. Only 16% of these stocks outperform the benchmark by 
an extreme +20%. 
In summary, table 4 demonstrates how new sell recommendations are 
performing far more closely with analyst expectations than their new buy counterparts 
12 months after the recommendation change. This is further substantiated by the fact 
                                           
9 Or 34% of all new buys- see last column. 
Table 4 here 
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that the percentage of sell stocks outperforming the appropriate benchmark by an 
extreme 20% is only half (16%) the equivalent percentage of extreme underperformance 




In this section, we first present the characteristics of our nonconforming new 
buy and new sell recommendations and then report our empirical results, which seek to 
explain the analyst ratings for these stocks in terms of cognitive bias and conflicts of 
interest. Of the 1,220 new buy stocks that underperform their respective benchmark by 
month 12, 34% (759) underperform by at least -20%. However, only a third (261) of 
these stocks have an accompanying research report available. On the other hand, 207 
(30%) new sell stocks outperform their respective benchmark 12 months after the 
recommendations were downgraded to a sell rating. Of those, about 111 (16%) 
outperform the benchmark by at least +20%. Research reports are available for just 
under two thirds of these new sell recommendations (71) and are spread throughout the 
sample period. All available research reports are obtained from the Thomson Financial 
Investext Plus database.  
 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 provides statistics for the main variables used in this analysis. Panel A 
refers to our 261 underperforming new buy recommendations, and panel B to our 71 
outperforming new sell recommendations. Results show that firms that are awarded new 
buy recommendations have larger market capitalization (mean FIRM_SIZE =$11.8 
billion) compared to their new sell counterparts (mean FIRM_SIZE =$3.2 billion) with 
the difference in means significant at the 0.01% level. The new buy stocks have 
generally performed well in the recent past with prior 12-month mean monthly return 
(PRICE_MOM) of 1.8% compared with new sells, when mean PRICE_MOM = -1.5%; 
the mean difference between the two monthly returns of 3.3% is significant at the 
0.01% level. New buy stocks have low book-to-market ratios (mean BTOM = 0.38) 
and, as such, may be classified as glamour stocks, whereas new sells stocks have high 
book-to-market ratios (mean BTOM = 1.00) and may be classified as value stocks, with 
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difference in means significant again at 0.01%.  The mean number of analysts following 
new buy stocks (mean ANALY_FOLL = 39) is higher than the number following new 
sell stocks (mean ANALY_FOLL = 24). This difference in numbers of analysts making 
nonconforming buy recommendations and nonconforming new sell recommendations is 
significant at 0.01% level. Finally, not surprisingly, the target price one year out is 
predicted to rise significantly (mean TGTPRCE_CHNG = 16%) in the case of new buys 
and to fall significantly in the case of new sells (mean TGTPRCE_CHNG = -14%), with 
difference in means again significant at 0.01%.  
As expected the language used by investment analysts to justify their research 
reports is more optimistic for new buys than is the case for new sells (significant at the 
10% level). However, there is no difference in the language indicating CERTAINTY 
and ACTIVITY between the nonconforming new buy and new sell analyst reports. The 
average number of corporate relationships (INVEST_RELATE) is higher for new buys 






Kurtosis for variables ACTIVITY, FIRM_SIZE and TGTPRCE_CHNG for 
nonconforming new buy recommendations indicates severe peaking compared to their 
nonconforming new sell recommendation equivalents. These same variables are also 
highly positively skewed (except ACTIVITY which is negatively skewed) compared 
with their nonconforming new sell counterparts. 
 
  6.2 Correlation matrix between variables 
       Table 6 presents the Pearsonian product moment correlation matrix for the 
model variables. Correlations between OPTIMISM and CERTAINTY as well as 
between OPTIMISM and FIRM_SIZE are positive and highly significant.  
PRICE_MOM has a negative and highly significant relationship with BTOM and a 
positive and significant relationship with TGTPRCE_CHNG. FIRM_SIZE has a 
negative and significant relationship with BTOM and a positive and significant 
Table 5 here 
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relationship with ANALY_FOLL. BTOM has a negative and significant relationship 
with ANALY_FOLL and TGTPRCE_CHNG, while the correlation between 
ANALY_FOLL and TGTPRCE_CHNG is also positive and significant. 
 
 
6.3 Logistic regression model results   
Table 7 reports the results from running the logistic regression model of 
equation 2. OPTIMISM is positive and significant (p<0.10, χ2 = 2.75) in explaining the 
type of stock rating analysts issue. This finding is inconsistent with null hypothesis H10 
that the tone of language used by analysts in the research reports they prepare to justify 
their stock ratings is not driven by optimism. The significance of OPTIMISM suggests 
that analysts’ overconfidence makes them issue stock ratings which eventually perform 
contrary to expectations. The odds ratio of 1.3 indicates that the odds will increase 
(greater chance of buy recommendations which significantly underperform the 
respective benchmark) by a factor of 1.3 for every unit increase in OPTIMISM if all 
other variables are held constant. However, neither the CERTAINTY nor ACTIVITY 
variables have any explanatory power. In the former case we cannot reject H1o with 
respect to the CERTAINTY measure, and in the latter case, we have no evidence to 
reject null hypothesis H2o that the language used by analysts in their reports is not 
biased with respect to the level of activity or change taking place within the firm. 
The parameter estimate for price momentum (PRICE_MOM) is positive and 
significant at p<0.001. This indicates that the probability that analysts will issue a buy 
recommendation that underperforms the benchmark is higher for stocks that have 
performed relatively well in the past. This suggests analysts prefer stocks that exhibit 
good previous performance (Stickel, 2000; Jegadeesh et al., 2004).  This finding is 
inconsistent with null hypothesis H30 that the impact of price momentum is negative or 
insignificant in predicting the type of stock recommendation that analysts issue. That 
analysts appear to use a stock’s past performance as being suggestive of its likely future 
performance is consistent with the operation of representative bias. 
Table 6 here 
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The parameter estimate for FIRM_SIZE is positive and significant at p<0.05, 
suggesting that the larger the firm the greater the likelihood that analysts will issue a 
nonconforming buy recommendation on the stock. This is either because analysts 
associate size of firm with good performance, or because there are other benefits that 
analysts derive when they issue buy ratings on large market capitalization stocks. The 
size effect is well documented in the literature in terms of explaining abnormal returns, 
but in a contrarian manner. Small firms typically outperform large firms, which is the 
opposite of what analysts appear to believe. The odds ratio shows that an increase in 
size of firm by one unit increases the probability of the analyst issuing a nonconforming 
new buy recommendation by a factor of 2.  This empirical finding is inconsistent with 
null hypothesis H40 that the size of the firm does not have any significant impact on the 
type of stock recommendation issued by analysts. These results are consistent with the 
idea that analysts see FIRM_SIZE (wrongly) as representative (representativeness bias) 
of a stock’s future performance.  
The parameter estimate for BTOM is negative, as expected, and significant at 
p<0.01. This result suggests that buy recommendations for stocks that subsequently 
underperform tend to be associated with glamour stocks. The chance of obtaining a 
nonconforming buy recommendation decreases when book-to-market increases. This 
finding is inconsistent with null hypothesis H50 that the firm’s book-to-market ratio 
does not have any significant impact on type of stock recommendation. Also, this result 
implies that, according to financial analysts, book-to market is representative of the 
future performance of the stock, although the sign of their relationship is wrong. The 




INVEST_RELATE measures whether a corporate finance relationship between 
the analyst’s investment bank and firm being reported on exists. In particular, we are 
interested in whether associated conflicts of interest have any bearing on the type of 
recommendation that analysts issue. The parameter estimate for INVEST_RELATE is 
positive, as expected, and significant at p< 0.01. These results are consistent with Lin 
and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), Barber et al. (2004), and Cliff 
Table 7 here 
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(2004) in that our analysts tend to issue more favorable recommendations on the stocks 
of firms with which their employer has a commercial relationship. The odds ratio 
associated with analysts issuing a nonconforming buy recommendation, if there is a 
corporate finance relationship between brokerage house and firm, is 2.9. Thus, we 
conclude, in contrast to null hypothesis H60, an existing relationship between brokerage 
house and firm has a significant impact on the type of recommendation that its analysts 
issue, which is consistent with conflict of interest concerns.  
Control variable analyst following, ANALY_FOLL, has no significant 
predictive ability. However, the parameter estimate for the control variable, change in 
target price, TGTPRCE_CHNG, is statistically significant at p<0.001, which suggests 
that there is a strong relationship between target price and the type of recommendation 
that analysts issue on the stock. Thus, when the target price on a stock is increased 
(decreased) then the probability that analysts will issue a nonconforming buy (sell) 
recommendation also increases. 
Approximate model explanatory power is 19% with likelihood χ2-ratio = 64.6, 
significant at p<0.001. This suggests that the model variables as a group play a 
significant role in the type of stock recommendation that analysts issue, particularly in 
differentiating between buy and sell recommendations that do not perform as expected.  
 
6.4. Additional tests 
To explore further the likely impact of cognitive biases on analyst stock 
recommendation decisions we work with full sample data. In particular, we conduct 
further tests of our underlying hypotheses using momentum, size, and book-to-market 
measures only (i.e., testing null hypotheses H30, H40 and H50 respectively). Considering 
the effect of only these factors and excluding other factors, particularly 
INVEST_RELATE, enables us to establish whether the regulatory authorities are 
addressing potential problems of analyst stock recommendation bias fully by focusing 
principally on conflict of interest issues.10 Should they also seek to review the important 
role of analyst cognitive bias which, may, in fact, be difficult to regulate?  
                                           
10 Content analysis of analysts’ reports was only conducted for nonconforming stocks; similarly with 
target prices as these were obtained from analyst reports. 
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Our two samples again consist of all new buy stocks which underperform the 
relevant benchmark by at least <-20%, and all new sell stocks that outperform the 
relevant benchmark by at least >+20%, and that meet all necessary data requirements. 
Because, in this case, there is no restriction imposed by the lack of availability of 
analyst research reports, our samples can be far larger compared to those in the previous 
sub-section i.e., 1,349 new buys and 429 new sells. 
We use a scaled-down version of the previous logit model (equation 2) to predict 
which measures of representativeness bias are significant in differentiating between 
nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations. Our second logit model 
(equation 3) regresses the dependent variable RATING against the independent 
variables momentum (PRICE_MOM), size (FIRM_SIZE), and book-to-market 
(BTOM), proxying for different aspects of representativeness bias, and the control 
variable measuring analyst following (ANALY_FOLL). Again, RATING = 1 if an 
analyst issues a new buy recommendation which subsequently underperforms the 
benchmark by <- 20%, and 0 if a new sell recommendation outperforms the benchmark 
by >+20%. The following logistic regression model is fitted:  
 










                                            = α  + β 1PRICE_MOMj,t- 1+ β 2FIRM_SIZE j,t-1   
                                                                   + β 3BTOM j,t-1 +  β 4ANALY_FOLL j, t-1 +ε j, ,t                                                                (3) 
           
                                                                                                                                  
where PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM and ANALY_FOLL are independent 
variables for firm j, β 1……β 4 are the regression parameter estimates, and ε j,t  is the 
error term.  
Table 8 reports the results from running equation 3. It shows that PRICE_MOM 
and BTOM are the two measures of representativeness bias which are individually 
significant in differentiating between new buy underperformers and new sell 
outperformers; both are significant at p<.001. The significance of PRICE_MOM and 
BTOM can be interpreted as indicating that the previous price performance of the firm 
and the firm’s growth stock status are being viewed by analysts as representative of 
what the future performance of the firm should be. However, there is no significant 
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difference in size of firm between those buy and sell recommendations that perform 
contrary to expectations (nonconforming stocks).11 The approximate model explanatory 
paper is 6%, and the model is significant at better than the 0.01% level. On this basis, 
we are again forced to reject at least null hypotheses H3o and H5o at conventional levels, 
consistent with analyst cognitive bias being an important driver of their investment 





              In addition to investigating whether factors associated with representativeness 
bias distinguish between nonconforming new buys and nonconforming new sells we 
perform further analysis by comparing the characteristics of all “wrong” new buys with 
the remaining population of buy recommendations and similarly for new sells.  In other 
words we compare the characteristics of all new buys (sells) that underperform 
(outperform) the benchmark with those that perform in line with expectations and 
outperform (underperform) the benchmark.12  Specifically, we re-run equation 3 two 
more times with the same independent variables as before. The dependent variable 
RATING = 1 in the first (second) case if the new buy (sell) recommendation strictly 
underperforms (outperforms) the benchmark and 0 otherwise. Our results are presented 
in Table 9. Model A relates to the comparison of those buy recommendations whose 
subsequent 12-month stock returns are lower than the respective benchmark return vs. 
those buy recommendations that are associated with returns greater than the benchmark 
return. Model B relates to the comparison of those sell recommendations whose 
subsequent 12-month stock returns are greater than the respective benchmark return vs. 






                                           
11 The control variable ANALY_FOLL is also highly significant (p<0.1%) in predicting analysts’ 
nonconforming ratings. 
12 The number of cases is presented in columns 2 and 3 of table 4.  
Table 8 here 
Table 9 here 
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            Model A in Table 9 indicates that those new buy recommendations with returns 
below the benchmark have significantly higher previous stock-price momentum 
(PRICE_MOM) and are of larger size (SIZE) than those that outperform the benchmark. 
However, though the coefficient on BTOM is negative, in line with expectations, it is 
not statistically significant.  
            Interestingly, in the case of model B, where we compare the characteristics of 
outperforming new sell recommendations, with all “correctly” performing sell 
recommendations, only SIZE is significant. However, in contrast to the model A results, 
the likelihood ratio itself is not significant suggesting that factors associated with 
representativeness bias are not important in differentiating between conforming and 
nonconforming new sell recommendations.  We speculate that analysts’ decision 
processes in the case of new sell recommendations may be less cognitively biased and  
be driven more by fundamental analysis. By their nature sell recommendations are less 
frequent and more visible than buy and hold recommendations. Therefore an incorrect 
judgment in this case is likely to be more costly to an analyst’s reputation than an 
incorrect judgment on a buy recommendation when other analysts are likely to be 
making similar stock recommendations (Womack, 1996). The reduced evidence of  
impact of cognitive biases in the case of new sell recommendations is consistent with 
the discussion of table 4 in section 5.2 above, which shows new sell recommendations 






In this study, we start by evaluating the performance of new buy and new sell 
stock recommendations over the 12 months subsequent to recommendation change. The 
aim is to establish whether stocks perform as expected or contrary to expectations, and 
to allow us to select those stocks that perform perversely for further analysis. Consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Stickel, 1995, Womack, 1996 and Barber et al. 2001) we find 
that the market does react to changes in stock recommendations. However, in the case 
of new buys, market reaction is complete by the end of the month in which the 
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recommendation is issued, while, in contrast, the market continues to react up to a year 
to new sell recommendations. We also find a large proportion of new buy and new sell 
recommendations do not perform as predicted by analysts, particularly new buy 
recommendations. 
We investigate factors that might be driving these analyst judgment calls that 
turn out subsequently to be wrong. Our logistical regression results show that the 
probability that analysts will issue a buy recommendation that underperforms the 
respective benchmark in a major way increases with degree of analyst optimism (a 
proxy for overconfidence bias). This is consistent with analysts believing they have 
superior investment abilities, leading them to overestimate the likely performance of the 
stocks they follow. This argument parallels that in other studies, such as Odean (1998a, 
1998b), Barber and Odean (2001), and Massey and Thaler (2005), who document that 
when investors are faced with difficult tasks they tend to overestimate the precision of 
their information and thereby become overconfident.  
  In addition to optimism, three measures of representativeness bias, positive prior 
returns, firm size, and book-to-market are individually statistically significant in 
explaining analysts’ nonconforming stock recommendations. These results suggest that 
stock characteristics are very important for analyst decision-making regarding the future 
performance of the stocks they follow. Our findings echo the conclusions of Stickel 
(2000), and Jegadeesh et al. (2004), that analysts prefer stocks with “best” 
characteristics.  
Importantly, potential conflicts of interest are also found to have a significant 
impact on the type of recommendations that analysts issue, as measured by investment 
banking relationships with the firm the analyst is following. These findings are 
consistent with the findings of Lin and McNichols (1998) and other studies (e.g., Barber 
et al. 2004; Cliff, 2004; Agrawal and Chen, 2005; and Madureira, 2004) that have been 
conducted after the implementation of various rules meant to control analyst behavior. 
All these studies conclude that the relationships between brokerage houses and firms 
have an effect on analysts’ stock ratings. Such results further confirm the recent concern 
by policy-makers and investors that analysts’ recommendations do not necessarily 
reflect their true beliefs about the stocks they follow. Further, these findings justify 
recent regulations governing analyst and brokerage firm activity.  
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In further analysis we find that analyst representativeness bias appears to be 
more manifest in their new buy recommendations than in their new sell 
recommendations. We argue that this is consistent with analysts making sell 
recommendations only after a more thorough fundamental analysis than they do for 
their new buy equivalents. Analysts have incentives to be more careful in making sell 
recommendations as an “incorrect” sell may be more costly to an analyst’s reputation as 
they are less frequent and hence more visible.  
Rules implemented to date only effectively seek to address the optimism in 
analysts’ recommendations arising from the corporate relationships that investment 
banks have with firms, suggesting that the SEC and others believe that the problem of 
optimistic stock recommendations is predominantly caused by analyst incentives 
associated with conflict of interest issues. This study addresses the problem of 
optimistic recommendations from a broader perspective and shows that there are other 
factors over and above conflicts of interest that are contributing to this problem, in 
particular, analyst cognitive bias, which is arguably inherent in the analyst’s job and 
may, in fact, be difficult to regulate. Such bias seems to be more manifest in analysts’ 
new buy recommendations than in their new sell counterparts  suggesting that analysts’ 
buy recommendations in particular will continue to lack investment value 
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Figure 1: Distribution of new buys, holds and sells between January 1997 and 
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Table 1: Sample selection process – stock recommendations 
 
 
Procedure Number of observations 
 
Total stock recommendations available in the IBES  database 
      Less recommendations made by non-top-ten brokerages 
Recommendations by the top-ten brokers 
      Less recommendations issued before Jan 1, 1997 and        
      after Dec 31, 2003 
Recommendations issued between Jan 1, 1997 and Dec 31, 2003 
      Eliminating reiterations by the same or other analysts 
Excluding utilities and financials1 
Total excluding utilities and financials 
      Eliminating US and non-US stocks with no data in CRSP 




















Table 2: Transition matrix of recommendation changes  
 
This table presents the transition matrix of changes in recommendation for our entire sample period, 
January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2003.  Old rating denotes the previous stock rating and new rating the 
current category. The transition percentages are shown in brackets. 
 
 
New rating  
 

































Total 4888 7373 1908 14169 - 
Total % (35%) (52%) (13%)  100% 




 Table 3: Performance of new buy and sell recommendations 
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for new buy and new sell recommendations. Column 1 
provides the performance period, columns 2-5 provide the BHAR mean, median, t-statistics and sign for the samples 
of buy and sell recommendations. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12-month horizon. 
 
****, ***, **, and * denote significance at .01%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 













Month 0 5.67 3.53 13.53****  262**** 2232 
Month 1 5.81 3.37 10.70**** 176**** 2225 
Month 2 5.45 2.42 8.33**** 104**** 2213 
Month 3 5.08 1.60 6.67****   58**** 2202 
Month 4 4.70 0.68 5.37****        24 2188 
Month 5 4.39 0.42 6.74****        16 2182 
Month 6 4.51 -0.71 4.55****       -20 2174 
Month 7 4.27 -1.62 3.78****       -54 2159 
Month 8 4.12 -2.98 3.21****    -88**** 2153 
Month 9 5.47 -3.77 3.53****    -98**** 2144 
Month 10 5.61 -5.28 3.16****  -125**** 2132 
Month 11 6.10 -5.39      2.95***  -122**** 2123 
Month 12 7.94 -4.97 3.74****  -104**** 2109 













Month 0   -5.59   -4.34 -6.80****  -93**** 1067 
Month 1   -7.20   -5.80 -7.70**** -105**** 1063 
Month 2   -7.60   -8.11 -5.90****  -96**** 1056 
Month 3   -8.13      -8.31 -5.69****  -97**** 1050 
Month 4   -8.82   -8.57 -6.27**** -103**** 1043 
Month 5   -9.99 -10.80 -6.50**** -111**** 1039 
Month 6 -10.66 -11.39 -7.56**** -101**** 1032 
Month 7 -11.75 -13.16 -7.31**** -101**** 1022 
Month 8 -11.30 -15.90 -5.60**** -110**** 1019 
Month 9 -11.99 -16.25 -5.31**** -119**** 1012 
Month 10 -12.29 -18.15 -4.60**** -128**** 1003 
Month 11 -10.96 -19.60 -3.70**** -128****  996 
Month 12 -13.61 -19.86 -4.65**** 135****  988 
 
1The statistic M is defined to be M= (N+-N-)/2 where N+ is the number of values that are greater than μo and N- is the 
number of values that are less than μo.  Values equal to μo are discarded.  Under the hypothesis that the population 
median is equal to μo, the sign test calculates the p-value for M using a binomial distribution. The test is based on the 
null hypothesis that the population median equals μo. The default value in for μo is 0. 
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Table 4: Performance of new buy and sell recommendations over time and selection of 
nonconforming stock recommendations 
 
This table shows how stocks with new buy/sell recommendations perform over the subsequent 12-month period. 
Column 1 gives the month after the change is made.  Column 2 shows the number of firms with performance in the 
expected direction. Column 3 shows the number of firms with performance in an unanticipated direction. Column 4 
shows the number and percentage of buy/sell recommendations yielding returns of at least 10% (-10%) as per 
brokerage firms’ definition of recommendations. Columns 5-8 provide the number and percentage of 
recommendations with abnormal returns in the extreme opposite to the expectation i.e., below/above 10% (-10%) and 
20% (-20%). 
 
Panel A: Performance of new buy recommendations over time 










No. of firms 
with positive 
return 
(BHAR > = 0) 
No. of firms 
with 
negative return 
(BHAR < 0) n % n % n % 
0 1378   854 535 32.89 354 15.86 121 5.42 
1 1292   940 604 36.65 495 22.17 221 9.90 
2 1220 1012 662 37.05 575 25.76 321 14.38 
3 1174 1058 655 35.71 659 29.52 383 17.15 
4 1139 1092 662 36.78 726 32.52 446 19.98 
5 1135 1097 669 36.42 832 37.27 558 25.00 
6 1096 1136 689 36.38 843 37.76 550 24.64 
7 1062 1170 697 36.34 881 39.47 591 26.47 
8 1028 1204 697 35.89 914 40.94 643 28.80 
9 1018 1214 697 35.75 922 41.30 658 29.48 
10   991 1241 695 34.86 963 43.14 696 31.18 
11   994 1238 701 35.08 973 43.59 749 33.55 
12   991 1220 698 34.68 996 44.62 759 34.00 
Panel B: Performance of new sell recommendations over time 










No. of firms 
with 
negative return 
(BHAR < 0) 
No of firms 
with positive 
return 
(BHAR > = 0) n % n % n % 
0 435 249 225 32.89   93 13.59   44 6.43 
1 447 237 286 41.81 129 18.85   68 9.94 
2 438 246 312 45.61 131 19.15   75 10.96 
3 439 245 317 46.35 139 20.32   83 12.13 
4 445 239 331 48.39 151 22.07   87 12.71 
5 440 244 349 51.02 171 25.00 130 19.00 
6 443 241 368 53.80 160 23.39 108 15.78 
7 443 241 373 54.53 159 23.24 102 14.91 
8 452 232 375 54.82 147 21.49 103 15.05 
9 461 223 388 56.73 145 21.19 102 14.91 
10 470 214 391 57.16 141 20.61 109 15.93 
11 470 214 393 57.46 153 22.36 120 17.54 
12 477 207 401 58.63 150 21.92 111 16.22 
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Table 5: Characteristics of nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations 
The table provides statistics on the characteristics of nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations that are issued between January 1, 1997 and December 
31, 2003. Column 1 shows the variables, and columns 2-11 provide the mean, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile, standard deviation, kurtosis, skewness, highest and 
lowest extreme values and mean difference between the two samples.   ****, ***,**, * denote significance at 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Underperforming new buy recommendations 
N = 261 


















Lowest Highest   
OPTIMISM 51.38 50.22 51.25 52.56 2.48 3.93 -0.26 38.46 61.35           0.843 * 
CERTAINTY 50.63 49.37 50.57 51.72 2.01 2.26 0.13 41.45 58.60       -0.004  
ACTIVITY 47.75 47.15 48.99 50.47 6.58 51.53 -6.05 -21.29 54.88        0.792  
PRICE_MOM 0.018 -0.010 0.016 0.041 0.054 2.010 0.029 -0.185 0.174                 0.033 **** 
FIRM_SIZE (LN) 7.94 6.75 7.81 8.98 1.64 -0.16 0.35 3.81 12.10                 0.940 **** 
FIRM_SIZE (RAW) 11,816 861 2,480 7,978 28236 19.836 4.287 45 181,286                8620 **** 
BTOM 0.368 0.104 0.257 0.458 0.478 33.187 4.746 0.001 4.508               -0.626 **** 
INVEST_RELATE 0.95 0 1 2 0.77 -1.31 0.07 0 2             0.225 ** 
ANALY_FOLL 30 19 27 39 15 0.111 0.811 6 100                5.789 **** 
TGTPRCE_CHNG 0.16 -0.07 0.06 0.20 0.59 51.20 5.77 -0.74 6.28                 0.298 **** 
            
Panel B: Outperforming new sell recommendations 
N = 71 


















Lowest Highest   
OPTIMISM 50.54 48.84 50.32 51.85 2.43 0.47 0.56 44.64 56.85          0.843 * 
CERTAINTY 50.63 49.24 50.55 51.92 2.42 4.27 1.03 45.44 61.19      -0.004  
ACTIVITY 48.56 47.02 48.50 50.29 3.54 10.84 0.60 33.84 65.86        0.792  
PRICE_MOM               -0.015 -0.045 -0.009 0.019 0.057 0.717 -0.058 -0.146 0.160                0.033 **** 
FIRM_SIZE (LN) 7.00 6.08 7.15 8.14 1.63 -0.22 -0.33 2.98 10.26                0.940 **** 
FIRM_SIZE (RAW) 3,195 439 1,284 3,434 5,090 9.82 2.91 19.88 28,600               8620 **** 
BTOM 0.995 0.317 0.506 0.958 1.502 10.128 3.212 0.051 7.514               -0.626 **** 
INVEST_RELATE 0.73 0 1 1 0.60 -0.53 0.21 0 2             0.225 ** 
ANALY_FOLL 24 13 24 33 13 -0.24 0.464 2 60                 5.789 **** 
TGTPRCE_CHNG -0.14 -0.33 -0.16 -0.02 0.37 6.95 1.66 -0.90 1.60                 0.298 **** 
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OPTIMISMj,t           =  a content analysis (Diction score) variable indicating endorsement of some 
person,  group, concept or event, or highlighting their positive entailments as 
captured in the language used  by the analyst when changing firm j’s stock 
rating. This variable serves as a proxy for analyst overconfidence; 
  
CERTAINTYj,t        =  a content analysis (Diction score) variable indicating resoluteness, inflexibility 
and completeness in the language used by an analyst when changing firm j’s 
stock rating. This variable serves as a proxy for analyst overconfidence; 
 
ACTIVITYj,t            = a content analysis (Diction score) variable indicating movement, change and 
the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia as captured in the 
language used by an analyst when changing firm j’s stock rating. This variable 
serves as proxy for analyst representativeness bias; 
 
PRICE_MOM j,t-1     = firm j’s percentage change in stock price over year t computed as stock price at 
time t/stock price at time t-1 expressed on an average monthly basis; 
 
FIRM_SIZE (LN)j,t-1= firm size in million dollars, measured using the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity for firm j at the end of the year preceding the change of 
recommendation; 
 
FIRM_SIZE (RAW)j,t- 1 = firm size in million dollars, measured as a the market value of equity for firm j 
at the end of the year preceding the change of recommendation; 
 
 
BTOM j,t-1                           = firm j’s book value per share divided by market value of equity per share at the 
end of the year preceding the change in recommendation; 
 
 
INVEST_RELATE j,t = a variable that takes a value of 0 if there is no relationship between the 
analyst’s brokerage firm and the firm, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of 
the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an 
underwriter and has current holdings; 
 
ANALY_FOLL j,t-1     = the number of analysts (for all brokerage firms available on IBES) following 
the firm in the calendar year that firm j’s recommendation is changed; 
 
 
TGTPRCE_CHNG j,t   = the percentage change in analyst projected 12 month target price for firm j 









Table 6: Pearsonian product – moment correlation coefficients 
 
This table  presents the correlation matrix for the following variables: OPTIMISMj,t  is a content analysis (Diction score) variable indicating endorsement of some 
person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive entailments as captured in the language used  by the analyst when changing firm j’s stock rating -  this 
variable serves as a proxy for analyst overconfidence; CERTAINTYj,t  is a content analysis (Diction score) variable indicating resoluteness, inflexibility and 
completeness in the language used by an analyst when changing firm j’s stock rating - this variable serves as a proxy for analyst overconfidence; ACTIVITYj,t  is 
content analysis (Diction score) variable indicating movement, change and the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia as captured in the language used by 
an analyst when changing firm j’s stock rating - this variable serves as a proxy for analyst representativeness bias; PRICE_MOM j,t-1 is firm j’s  percentage change in 
stock price over year t computed as stock price at time t/stock price at time t-1  expressed on an average monthly basis; FIRM_SIZE j,t-1 is firm size in million dollars 
measured using the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for firm j at the end of the year preceding the change of recommendation; BTOM j,t-1 is firm j’s book 
value per share divided by market value of equity per share at the end of the year preceding the change in recommendation. INVEST_RELATE j,t is a variable that 
takes a value of 0 if there is no relationship between the analyst’s brokerage firm and the firm, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of the firm or has current holdings in 
the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an underwriter and has current holdings; ANALY_FOLL j,t-1 is the number of analysts (for all brokerage firms available on 
IBES) following the firm in the calendar year that firm j’s recommendation is changed. P-values are listed below the correlation coefficient, and TGTPRCE_CHNG j,t 
is the percentage change in analyst projected target price for firm j computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t -1) –1].  ****, ***, **, and * denote 


































CERTAINTY     0.1366 
       (0.0127)** 
       
ACTIVITY   -0.0975 
    (0.0758)* 
         0.1353 
            (0.0136)** 
      
PRICE_MOM    0.0755 
   (0.1714) 
          0.0389 
          (0.4817) 
0.0853 
(0.1222) 
     
FIRM_SIZE    0.1239 
       (0.0252)** 
       -0.0059 
         0.9153 
-0.0633 
 (0.2542) 
      -0.0557 
       (0.3154) 
    
BTOM  -0.1679 
          (0.0023)**** 
       -0.0673 
         (0.2250) 
0.0461 
(0.4061) 
     -0.1214 
         (0.0284)** 
  -0.4008 
          (0.0001)**** 
   
INVEST_RELATE  0.0403 
 (0.4639) 
        0.0587 
         (0.2866) 
0.0639 
(0.2458) 
      0.0191 
      (0.7294) 
   0.0248 
   (0.6549) 
-0.0719 
  (0.1955) 
  
ANALY_FOLL  0.0833 
 (0.1298) 
       -0.0198 
         (0.7181) 
-0.066 
   (0.2262) 
      0.0070 
      (0.8993) 
   0.7639 
          (0.0001)**** 
-0.2927 
         (0.0001)**** 
    -0.0253 
    (0.6463) 
 
TGTPRCE_CHNG2  0.0692 
 (0.2226) 
        0.0702 
         (0.2162) 
0.0272 
(0.6315) 
      0.2451 
        (<.0001)**** 
   0.0585 
   (0.3062) 
 -0.1065 




    (0.0567)** 
         
2The correlation between change in target price (TGTPRCE_CHNG) and RATING is significant at the 0.1% level.
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Table 7: Determinants of new buy/sell recommendations for nonconforming stocks 
 
                                     This table presents the logit regression on all model and control variables. The logit regression model is as shown in equation 2. The dependent variable is the stock rating. For each 
variable included in the model, the predicted sign, coefficient estimate, Wald χ2 and odds ratio (EXP (β)) are presented in columns 2-5 respectively. R2, likelihood ratio and number of 
observations the regression are provided. The dependent variable RATING is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the recommendation is an nonconforming new buy, and 0 if 












            Wald χ2  
 
EXP (β) 
INTERCEPT ? -3.112 0.388 - 
OPTIMISM + 0.107  2.758* 1.114 
CERTAINTY + -0.053 0.534 0.948 
ACTIVITY - -0.015 0.179 0.985 
PRICE_MOM + 12.217        13.50**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.331      3.867** 1.938 
BTOM - -0.508   3.102* 1.059 
INVEST_RELATE + 0.592      6.113*** 2.892 
ANALY_FOLL + -0.009 0.334 1.024 
TGTPRCE_CHNG + 1.926       11.609**** 20.79 
Maximum rescaled  R2 
Likelihood ratio χ2 
N 
19% 
       64.57**** 
332 
   




Table 8: Factors that differentiate between nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations: the role of representativeness bias 
 
This table presents the logit regression on behavioral factors which potentially differentiate between nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations. For each 
variable, the predicted sign, coefficient estimate, Wald χ2 and odds ratio (EXP(β)) are presented in columns 2-5 respectively. R2, likelihood ratio and number of 
observations in the regression are also provided. The dependent variable RATING is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the recommendation is a 
nonconforming new buy and 0 if the recommendation is a nonconforming new sell. The independent variables are as shown in table 5. ****,***, **, and * denote 














Intercept ? 0.818 6.169**** - 
PRICE_MOM + 8.223 54.623**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.031      0.358 1.031 
BTOM - -0.290 17.509**** 0.748 
ANALY_FOLL + 0.010 3.500**** 1.010 
Maximum rescaled R2  
Likelihood ratio χ2 
N 
 
         6% 
     109.08**** 
      1,778 
   
















Table 9:  Factors that differentiate between underperforming (outperforming) new buy (new sell) recommendations and all other buy (sell) recommendations 
during the sample period: the role of representativeness bias   
 
This table presents the logit regression on behavioral factors which potentially differentiate between those new buy (sell) recommendations with subsequent 
performance below (above) the respective benchmark with those new buy (sell) recommendations with subsequent performance greater (less) than the benchmark 
returns. For each variable, the predicted sign, coefficient estimate, Wald χ2 and odds ratio (EXP(β)) are presented in columns 2-5 for new buys (columns 6-9 for new 
sells) respectively. R2, likelihood ratio χ 2, and number of observations in the regression is provided below the variables. For model A, RATING = 1 if the new buy 
recommendation   underperforms the benchmark return and 0 if the new buy recommendation outperforms the benchmark return. For model B, RATING = 1 if the new 
sell recommendation   outperforms the benchmark return and 0 if the new sell recommendation underperforms the benchmark return. The independent variables are as 
shown in table 5.  ****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 








sign for buys 















sign for sells 





      
 
      Wald χ2 
 
   
 
EXP (β ) 
Intercept ? -1.071 17.521**** - ? 0.364 0.473 - 
PRICE_MOM +  0.029 11.069**** 1.030 - -0.004 0.071 0.995 
FIRM_SIZE +  0.235 37.856**** 1.265 - -0.178   4.254** 0.836 
BTOM - -0.050    0.417 0.951 + -0.007 0.008 0.993 
ANALY_FOLL +  0.019 23.702**** 0.981 - 0.0043 0.225 1.004 
Maximum rescaled R2 
Likelihood ratio χ2  
N                                    
     3.37% 
 55.73****   
   2211 




The Wald statistics are distributed χ2 with 1 degree of freedom. 
 
 
